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SHORT-CIRCUITED: HOW CONSTITUTIONAL 
SILENCE AND POLITICIZED FEDERALISM LED TO 
APPELLATE PROCESS 
The judiciary is now under consideration. I view it as you do, as defective both in 
its general structure, and many of its particular regulations. The attachment of the 
Eastern members, the difficulty of substituting another plan, with the consent of those 
who agree in disliking the bill, the defect of time &c. will however prevent any radical 
alterations. The most I hope is that some offensive violations of Southern jurisprudence 
may be corrected, and that the system may speedily undergo a re-consideration under 
the auspices of the Judges who alone will be able perhaps to set it to rights. 
-James Madison [1789] 
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I. THE CIRCUIT COURTS HAVE DETERIORATED FROM A PERSONALLY CONDUCTED TO 
A BUREAUCRATICALLY CONDUCTED APPELLATE PROCESS.
In drafting Article Three of the United States Constitution, James Madison and his 
co-authors did not include methods for efficiently adapting the federal courts to an ever-
evolving caseload.1 This profound lack of direction planted an infection in the federal court 
system, a potentially fatal illness called the crisis of volume. 2 Politicized federalism has 
served as a catalyst, perpetually spreading the infection and exacerbating the crisis.3
The term crisis is a misnomer in this instance, as most crises are temporary 
emergencies so pressing that they demand immediate attention and resolution. Ironically, 
warnings regarding the crisis of volume  have been neglected for decades.4 This 
Comment will address the crisis, which currently plagues the United States Courts of 
Appeals (hereinafter the Circuits ).5 The Circuits are weighed down by an overwhelming 
caseload in the same way Atlas was weighed down by the world; except that Atlas was 
never expected to dispense justice effectively while shouldering his burden.6
The Circuits have endured the nagging crisis of volume  because no expedient 
manner of adapting the federal courts is mentioned in the United States Constitution.7 The 
Founding Fathers set forth the structure of the legislature in Article One, the executive in 
Article Two, and the judiciary in Article Three.8 With significantly less text than those 
preceding, Article Three is silent regarding the inner workings of the federal courts, and 
the proper measures for maintaining reasonably efficient courts were left to the discretion 
of Congress.9 However, the discretion of Congress is often in opposition to the needs of 
the federal courts; that opposition is largely caused by a fundamental principle at the heart 
of American government, federalism.10
Federalism is the oldest, most pervasive, and politically polarizing debate in 
American history.11 Justice O Connor, in New York v. United States, described federalism 
as a constitutional question . . . as old as the Constitution: It consists of discerning the 
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 2. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (Apr. 2, 1990). The 
term crisis of volume  was used by the Federal Courts Study Committee in its 1990 report to refer to the danger 
the judiciary faced under an overwhelming caseload. 
3. See generally Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken Is It?, 39 TULSA 
L. REV. 691 (2004) (discussing the politicization of judicial issues, in the context of the appointment process); 
Carl M. McGowan, Federalism – Old and New – and the Federal Courts, 70 GEO. L.J. 1421 (1982) (explaining 
the ways in which federalism has affected the federal courts). 
4. See FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109; Miner 56, Roger J., Dealing with the Appellate 
Caseload Crisis: The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee Revisited, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517 
(2013) (clarifying that the crisis worsened following the publication of the Federal Courts Study Committee s
report).
 5. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109. 
 6. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109; ROBIN HARD & H. J. ROSE, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK 
OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY: BASED ON H.J. ROSE S HANDBOOK OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY 49 (2004) (providing an 
explanation of the Greek myth of Atlas, known for helping the Titans rebel against the Olympians. Zeus punished 
Atlas  rebellion by mandating that he hold up the sky for eternity). 
7. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
8. See U.S. CONST. arts. I III. 
9. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 10. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
11. Id.
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proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the States. 12 Any 
matter that invokes a question of federalism of where the authority to govern lies will
be accompanied by the politicization of the issue.13 This Comment refers to those parallel 
manifestations of politics and federalism as politicized federalism. 
Politicized federalism is rampant in areas of confusion caused by constitutional 
silence.14 The absence of provision in Article Three for adapting the courts has meant a 
prevalence of politicized federalism in moments when that adaptation is needed.15 With 
politicized federalism acting as a catalyst for the infection, the federal judiciary has been 
unable to defend itself, as if there were no judicial immune system at all.16 Lawmakers 
must consider a new approach for addressing the crisis of volume,  and the judiciary 
requires its own immune system to ward off future attacks.17
Article Three s silence and politicized federalism allow the crisis of volume  to 
reverberate throughout each Circuit, without treatment or cure.18 Since the United States 
Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari in only a handful of cases, the Circuits answer 
most legal questions brought before them with finality.19 Therefore, the bulk of stare 
decisis originates in the Circuits, which have long been infected by the crisis of 
volume. 20
The infection has persisted for so long that it has caused serious harm to the 
hallmarks of our judiciary. 21 With politicized federalism preventing necessary 
adaptation, the Circuits were unable to preserve those judicial hallmarks.22 The erosion of 
judicial hallmarks eventually led to an unplanned evolution in the Circuits, from a 
personally conducted  appellate process to a bureaucratically conducted  appellate 
process.23 The bureaucratic appellate process has had detrimental effects; in light of these, 
lawmakers must address the crisis of volume  and ensure that the judiciary is protected 
from further harm.24
Part II of this Comment will study an ancestor of the crisis of volume  infection, 
the early practice of circuit riding, to demonstrate that the current illness stems from a flaw 
12. Id.
 13. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of 
American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1923 (2014). 
 14. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 2003, 2006 08 (2009). 
15. Infra Part III. 
16. Infra Parts III IV. 
 17. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109. 
 18. Thomas B. Marvell, Appellate Capacity and Caseload Growth, 16 AKRON L. REV. 43, 59 (1982) 
(discussing the growth of appellate caseloads, how those caseloads apply increasing pressure on the Circuits, and 
the negative consequences of an appellate court exceeding its capacity). 
19. About the Supreme Court, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-
resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/about (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 20. Shay Lavie, Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure, 27 STAN. L. & POL Y REV. 57, 58 (2016) 
(discussing the importance of the appellate courts in the federal system and the implications of the crisis of 
volume on those courts). 
 21. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109. 
22. Id.
 23. Howard T. Markey, On the Present Deterioration of the Federal Appellate Process: Never Another 
Learned Hand, 33 S.D. L. REV. 371, 376 77 (1988). 
 24. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109. 
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in what could be described as the judiciary s DNA, Article Three of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, Part II will illustrate the daily challenges legal practitioners experienced in 
the early years of the judiciary, through the eyes of a young nineteenth-century attorney, 
Abraham Lincoln. Next, Part II will offer background for analysis and provide evidence 
of the burden that the early United States Supreme Court justices grudgingly endured, for 
over a century, until the practice of circuit riding was finally abolished. Lastly, Part II will 
compare the judicial burdens of circuit riding with the modern crisis of volume; 
constitutional silence and politicized federalism will be identified as the causes of both 
burdens. 
Part III will examine the relationship between Congress and the Judiciary in three 
steps. First, Part III will look to Article Three and the limited authority its language 
delegates to Congress. Next, Part III will provide a brief history of legislative acts that 
affected the judicial framework. Lastly, Part III will examine the judiciary s efforts to cure 
the crisis of volume and will identify politicized federalism as the reason for Congress
failure to treat the infection. 
Part IV will analyze the crisis of volume as it was described in the Report of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee in 1990. Then, Part IV will show that the crisis has 
become more severe since that report was released and discuss the harmful consequences 
of its current state. Lastly, Part IV will mourn the erosion of the personally conducted
federal appellate process that occurred as a direct result of the crisis of volume; the need 
for a new approach to judicial adaptation will be explained. 
II. CIRCUIT RIDING WAS AN EARLY EXAMPLE OF CONGRESS TENDENCY TO HINDER 
JUDICIAL ADAPTATION.
There are clear similarities between the current crisis of volume and its now-extinct 
ancestor, the practice of circuit riding.25 As Congress statutorily mandated under the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal circuit courts were divided into regional jurisdictions.26
For about half of American history, justices of the United States Supreme Court were 
assigned to and presided over these regional jurisdictions.27 This arrangement meant that 
justices were obligated to travel across frontier country so they could fulfill their duties at 
their assigned circuit court.28 The practice consumed an enormous amount of judicial time 
and energy, as travel across long distances through largely unsettled terrains by way of 
slow, unreliable, and often dangerous means of transportation took its toll.29
Beyond the difficulties of geography, perceptions of potential unconstitutionality 
swirled around the practice, as it left open the possibility of judges rehearing cases at 
different levels of the federal court system.30 The original circuit courts were composed 
of three-judge panels, which included a district judge from the local community and two 
25. Infra Part II.C. 
 26. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74. 
27. Id. at 74 75. 
28. Id.
 29. Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
1753, 1765 (2003). 
30. Id. at 1794 95. 
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circuit riding Supreme Court justices.31 Given the right circumstances, a district judge 
could rehear a case they had previously presided over in their district, although the 
language of the Judiciary Act of 1789 prohibited a district judge from voting in any case 
of appeal or error from his own decision . . . 32 However, if appealed, a decision at the 
circuit level could reach the Supreme Court, and a justice that had been involved in the 
circuit court s decision could hear the matter again.33
Justices of the Supreme Court, raising concerns of the practice s impracticality and 
perceived unconstitutionality, repeatedly asked Congress to abolish the practice and create 
circuit judgeship positions.34 However, as a result of Federalist political motivations, the 
early Court could not persuade Congress to end the practice.35 Like the modern crisis of 
volume, circuit riding strained the administration of justice in a variety of ways and 
persisted for decades despite judges  concerns.36 Both circuit riding and the contemporary 
crisis of volume were allowed to continue for the same reasons: (1) Article Three of the 
Constitution does not provide an adequate avenue for remedying either infection, and (2) 
politicized federalism prevented Congress from addressing the negative consequences of 
each.37 The circuit riding practice should serve as a reminder that the judiciary s current 
crisis is not new, but rather the latest manifestation of an old illness. 
A. Until Five Score and Nine Years Ago, Circuit Riding Plagued the Federal Judiciary. 
The practice of circuit riding infected the judiciary for over a century.38 Attorneys 
and judges trekked through wild landscapes to uphold order in the courts, enduring frontier 
travel over vast distances.39 Among these frontier practitioners was Abraham Lincoln, a 
young circuit riding attorney from Illinois.40 Lincoln practiced in the Eighth Circuit of 
Illinois not a federal jurisdiction but the daily challenges of circuit riding were similar at 
the state and federal levels.41 Lincoln s career is an interesting example of the circuit riding 
practice.42
It is commonly known that Lincoln was a practicing attorney before his presidency, 
but the nature of his time practicing law is rarely discussed outside the wood-paneled 
offices of legal scholars and historians.43 Rather than being confined to a prestigious law 
firm, Lincoln chose to be a traveling practitioner and received considerably less pay for 
 31. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74 75. 
32. Id. at 75. 
 33. Glick, supra note 29, at 1794 95. 
34. Id. at 1777. 
35. Id. at 1777 78. Justice Iredell wrote to his wife, Hannah, in 1796 upon realization that Congress would 
not abolish circuit riding, stating [w]e are still doomed, I fear, to be wretched Drudges. Id. at 1778. 
36. Id. at 1767. (explaining the justices  desire to change the system before institutional ossification  set in) 
(quoting 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND 
BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 554 (Paul A. Freund gen. ed., 1971)). 
37. Infra Part II.C. 
 38. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754, 1755. 
39. Id. at 1757. 
 40. ALBERT A. WOLDMAN, LAWYER LINCOLN 82 (2001). 
41. Id. at 85. 
42. See generally id.
43. Id. at 6. 
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his efforts.44 Lincoln was admitted to the Illinois Bar on September 9, 1836.45 He practiced 
law as a circuit rider, which meant he traveled a geographical circuit to statutorily 
designated locations where court was held.46 Lincoln s reputation as an elite orator was 
arguably first cultivated when he returned to circuit riding in Illinois after a brief period 
running for the state s legislature.47
In the Eighth Circuit of Illinois, Lincoln was well-known and witnessed the ongoing 
overhaul of the state s court system.48 David Davis, an attorney Lincoln knew well, was 
elected to the Supreme Court of Illinois, taking on the Eighth Circuit jurisdiction and its 
requisite circuit riding duties.49 For most of Lincoln s legal career, the Eighth Circuit was 
composed of fourteen counties, which were still largely unsettled.50 The daily challenges 
of practicing law while riding circuit are completely foreign to attorneys today.51
Lincoln s traveling companions were fellow prominent attorneys and judges of the 
time, as he was part of the big five  of this early horseback circuit. 52 The big five
consisted of Abraham Lincoln, John Stuart, Stephen Logan, David Davis, and Edward 
Baker, all renowned for their prowess in the legal profession.53 Davis, later appointed by 
Lincoln as a justice of the United States Supreme Court, wrote to family about his 
experiences traveling the circuit, explaining in one letter that he and his traveling 
companions were deluged by rain [that] spring. The windows of heaven [were] certainly 
44. Id. at 82. 
 45. Lawyer Profile of Abraham Lincoln, ATT Y REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM N OF THE SUP. CT.
OF ILL., https://www.iardc.org/ (follow Lawyer Search  hyperlink; then search last name field for Lincoln
and search first name field for Abraham ). 
46. Circuit Riding, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/circuit-riding (last visited Sept. 15, 
2019). 
 47. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 82. 
48. Id. at 85 86; Lincoln s admittance to the bar in 1836 came at a critical time for Illinois  courts, and 
Lincoln had a front row seat to the judicial evolution of his home state. Timeline of Judicial History, NINETEENTH 
JUD. CIRCUIT CT., 19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/1289/Timeline-of-Judicial-History (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). 
The Supreme Court of Illinois Territory and the county courts were established in 1814; the state s supreme court 
judges had jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters, along with the responsibility of each to ride their own 
circuits. Id. A few years later in 1818, Illinois became the twenty-first state to enter the Union, and the state s
constitution established its judicial system. Id. The state s circuit courts remained under the jurisdiction of the 
Illinois Supreme Court judges until 1835, when circuit judgeships were created, and the Illinois Supreme Court 
justices were relieved of their circuit duties. Id. In 1841, Illinois  legislature abolished the circuit judgeships and, 
again, required the justices to ride circuit. Id. The creation and subsequent abolition of circuit judgeships also 
occurred at the federal level. Infra Part III.B.ii. 
 49. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 81. In 1841, Judge Samuel H. Treat was elected to the Supreme Court of 
Illinois and presided over the Eighth Circuit, holding court for two days at a time, twice annually, in each county 
under his jurisdiction. Id.
50. Id. at 87. 
 51. Guy C. Fraker, The Real Lincoln Highway: The Forgotten Lincoln Circuit Markers, 25 J. ABRAHAM
LINCOLN ASS N 76, 76 (Winter 2004). 
The riders are on the road from Metamora, the seat of Woodford County, to Bloomington, seat of 
McLean County. They are in the vicinity of the county line. Other than an occasional farmstead and 
a rare passing rider, they have seen no other sign of settlement for some time. As they ride, their 
conversation is accompanied by the whistle of quail, interrupted by the flushing of grouse. They have 
seen retreating wolves keeping their distance, and they have frequently startled deer from their grassy 
hiding places. 
Id.
 52. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 80. 
53. Id.
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open. Bad roads, broken bridges, swimming of horses and constant wettings [were] the 
main incidents in Western travel. 54
The Eighth Circuit covered about one-fifth of Illinois.55 Judge Davis held court in 
all of its fourteen counties, which entailed a round trip of approximately 500 miles.56
Lincoln and Judge Davis were the only members of the Illinois Bar that consistently 
travelled to all of the counties in the Eighth Circuit.57 On horseback, Lincoln would set 
out for the circuit carrying his saddle-bags stuffed with documents and a few changes of 
lighter apparel, a huge weatherbeaten cotton umbrella to shelter him from the elements, 
and a law book or two, to be gone for weeks at a stretch. 58 The Eighth Circuit educated 
Lincoln, provided him with myriad lessons in legal practice, and prepared him for political 
challenges to come.59
It could be argued that Lincoln s humble beginnings riding the Eighth Circuit in 
Illinois molded him into the man that history now applauds.60 The unique and burdensome 
challenges of circuit riding required both trail-smarts and book-smarts.61 A camaraderie 
formed between Lincoln and his colleagues as they tackled these challenges together, and 
Lincoln s ability to lead in trial or on trail made him a well-rounded practitioner.62 Lincoln 
and his peers encountered an array of challenges in their circuit travels.63 For instance: 
Lincoln s extremely long legs caused his circuit-riding companions to appoint him as scout 
in testing the depth of the streams. By taking off his boots and stockings and rolling up his 
trousers he could easily find the shallow crossing-places and lead his cronies through the 
current. On one occasion after a severe rainstorm, a party of itinerant lawyers, including 
Judge Davis, stripped naked and with their clothes thrown in bundles over their shoulders, 
mounted their horses, and led by the gigantic, rawboned Lincoln, crossed the flood.64
54. Id. (quoting Letter from David Davis to Julius Rockewelle (May 14, 1844), in HARRY EDWARD PRATT,
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 162, 162 63 (1930)). 
55. Id. at 81. 
56. Id.
 57. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 82. 
58. Id.
 59. ROGER L. SEVERNS, PRAIRIE JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF ILLINOIS COURTS UNDER FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 172 (John A. Lupton ed., 2015). Many of Lincoln s greatest challenges would be dealt from a 
stack of cards held by an old friend, Stephen H. Douglas, who grew up alongside Lincoln. Id. They received their 
educations from the same school; the pair were friends and, at times, fervent rivals in their careers. Id. Lincoln 
and Douglas also went by Big Sucker and Little Giant, respectively, nicknames they obtained early in their 
careers as clear references to their starkly different statures. Id. Lincoln spent the majority of his early career 
practicing law, notwithstanding a brief period running for the Senate of Illinois. Id. He suffered defeat to none 
other than Douglas, in the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates, and thus returned home to the Eighth Circuit. Id. 
Douglas was already a judge on the Supreme Court of Illinois, and now he had defeated Lincoln in a race to the 
Illinois Senate. Id. Honest Abe returned home from that battle defeated, but he was undoubtedly triumphant in 
the war. Id. With a reputation that now had national appeal, he became the Republican Party s candidate in the 
next presidential election. Id. Big Sucker would go on to win that election, becoming the sixteenth President of 
the United States of America and, undeniably, one of the greatest Presidents the American Republic has had the 
privilege of electing. Now, in the law library at the University of Tulsa, College of Law, Lincoln s statue stands 
about fifty feet from the desk at which this Comment was drafted. 
 60. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 5 6.
61. Id. at 80. 
62. Id. at 83 84. 
63. Id. at 80. 
64. Id. at 82 83. 
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Lincoln represents an array of practitioners who rode circuit in the frontier of 
American law, clearing a path for future generations of attorneys and judges.65 Although 
Lincoln rode circuit at the state level, judges also endured the circuit riding practice in 
federal jurisdictions, including justices of the United States Supreme Court.66
B. The Supreme Court Endured Circuit Riding for Over a Century. 
In their circuit duties, justices of the nation s highest Court endured the same type 
of perilous travel as was required of Lincoln in Illinois.67 Two justices of the Supreme 
Court traveled twice each year to a circuit where they sat on a panel, along with a district 
judge of the state with original jurisdiction.68 About a half-century before Lincoln s career 
began, the Judiciary Act of 1789 established three federal circuit jurisdictions: the Eastern 
Circuit, the Middle Circuit, and the Southern Circuit.69 Each of these three jurisdictions 
posed unique challenges to its presiding justices; the Eastern and Middle Circuits were 
relatively well-established, but the Southern Circuit was largely frontier at the time.70
Beyond the issues of landscape and geography, the physical health of the justices posed 
additional challenges, as older justices struggled with the hardships of strenuous travel.71
To further complicate matters, the time required for justices to complete their circuit duties 
meant spending nearly half a year away from their responsibilities back home.72
Justices of the early Supreme Court strongly opposed the practice of circuit riding, 
as it required an extraordinary amount of frontier travel at a time when transportation was 
anything but comfortable.73 The first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay, even 
wrote to President George Washington describing the difficulties of riding circuit and 
requesting that Washington ask Congress to address the issue.74 Riding circuit was so 
despised amongst the early Supreme Court justices that the first Court agreed to take a 
reduction in salary in exchange for Congress appointing a separate circuit judiciary. 75
Still, a primarily Federalist Congress refused to address the justices  circuit riding 
concerns.76 Instead of listening to the Court s pleas for change, Congress asked the 
Attorney General to review and report on whether the procedure required modification.77
At that time, the Supreme Court did not have the power to choose which cases 
 65. The discussion in this section of President Lincoln s experiences riding circuit in Illinois should serve as 
an illustration for the subsequent section, where the circuit riding practice is examined at the federal level, and 
those enduring hardships are justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 66. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754. 
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1757. 
 69. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74 75. 
 70. Glick, supra note 29, at 1765. 
71. Id. at 1766. 
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1754. 
74. Id. at 1768. 
 75. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754. 
76. Id. at 1769. 
77. Id. Congress has a tendency to hear the judiciary s pleas for change, assign officials to report on the issue, 
and subsequently never follow up on the report. For more recent examples, see FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra
note 2; FED. JUD. CTR., infra note 249. 
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deserved its attention.78 Rather, Congress dictated which cases and controversies would 
be heard by the Court after appeal from the district or circuit courts.79 The justices often 
heard the same case during the course of their circuit duties and later on appeal to the 
Supreme Court.80 At first, the Circuits were primarily trial courts of original jurisdiction; 
thus, a justice could serve as both a trial and an appellant judge in the same case.81 Justices 
typically recused themselves from cases they had previously presided over.82 However, 
this was not always true as all available justices were sometimes required to participate in 
a case for a quorum to exist.83
The early Court made the most of its circuit duties, spreading judicial influence and 
setting the stage for American jurisprudence while on the circuit.84 Justices often 
expressed legal theories at the circuit level that they would later elaborate in opinions of 
the highest Court.85 For example, in discussing the prototype principle of judicial review, 
Justice Chase explained that some of the judges [had] individually in the Circuits decided 
that the Supreme Court [could] declare an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional, and 
therefore invalid, but there [was] no adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon this 
point. 86
The early Supreme Court justices complied with their statutory obligation to ride 
circuit, but their compliance should not be construed as consent.87 Rather, the early Court 
had no other choice.88 Possessing the power neither of the purse nor of the sword, the 
Court was relatively weak and uncertain of its authority.89 Unfortunately, the early 
Congress was quite sure of its powers and had little incentive to wield them in favor of the 
judiciary.90
C. Congress Is Historically Uncooperative When Adaptation Is Needed in the Circuits. 
The early Congress regarded the circuit riding practice as an apparatus for furthering 
Federalist ideals.91 Congress believed circuit riding transformed the justices into 
republican schoolmaster[s],  endowed with federal authority and the ability to disperse 
national political views amongst the states.92 At a time when the competing principles of 
Federalism and Anti-Federalism dominated American politics, Federalists viewed the 
 78. Glick, supra note 29, at 1761. 
79. Id. at 1762. 
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1762 63. 
 83. Glick, supra note 29, at 1763. 
84. See Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. 14 (4 Dall. 1800) (dealing with the issue of judicial review, at the circuit 
level, three years prior to the Court s decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 1803)). 
85. Id.
86. Id. at 19. 




91. Id. at 1754. 
 92. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754. 
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practice of circuit riding as a means of advancing their political philosophy.93 From a 
Federalist perspective, there was value in the highest Court s justices riding circuit because 
they could lecture the local citizens not only on the relevant law, but also on the nature 
of centralized government, the responsibility of the citizenry, and the ways in which the 
new government served their needs. 94 Furthermore, [f]avorable public opinion was 
necessary to ensure the survival of the young Republic and the active and visible presence 
of the justices would help foster loyalty toward the new form of government and somewhat 
weaken the people s previous allegiance to their state s government. 95
When the Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted, the United States House of 
Representatives and Senate were both controlled by the Pro-Administration party, an early 
name attributed to Federalist ideals.96 The first Senate was composed of eighteen Pro-
Administration and eight Anti-Administration senators, while the first House of 
Representatives consisted of thirty-seven Pro-Administration and twenty-eight Anti-
Administration representatives.97 Since the Federalist, or Pro-Administration, ideology 
benefited from justices riding circuit, there was little political incentive to end the practice, 
despite the justices  complaints.98
The highest Court in America rode circuit for over a hundred years.99 There were 
two prominent issues raised by justices during this period.100 Justices dealt with serious 
physical hardships during the burgeoning days of the Republic . . . [and] found it 
impossible to attend simultaneously to the ever-growing docket of the Supreme Court and 
to their circuit duties. 101 Nonetheless, it is apparent that the young American judiciary 
was powerless to modify its own procedures without a cooperative Congress.102
Those hoping to end circuit riding sought recourse in the courts when efforts to do 
so in Congress proved futile.103 The constitutionality of circuit riding was questioned in 
Stuart v. Laird.104 Justice Patterson, writing for the Court, gently alluded to Congress
refusal to abolish circuit riding.105 Patterson identified the quarrels of the Federalist and 
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1760. 
95. Id.
96. See Party Division, U.S. SENATE, senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2019); Party 
Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2019). 
97. See sources cited supra note 96. 




102. Id. at 1755. 
103. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1 Cranch 1803). 
104. Id. at 305 (elucidating that [b]esides, as judge of the supreme court, he could not exercise the duties or 
jurisdiction assigned to the court of the fifth circuit, because, by the constitution of the United States, the supreme 
court has only appellate jurisdiction; except in the two cases where a state or foreign minister shall be a party. 
The jurisdiction of the supreme court, therefore, being appellate only, no judge of that court, as such, is authorized 
to hold a court of original jurisdiction. No act of congress can extend the original jurisdiction of the supreme 
court beyond the bounds limited by the constitution.  This opinion comes shortly after and in response to the 
Judiciary Act of 1802, which again gave the Supreme Court justices jurisdiction over the circuit courts, after the 
Judiciary Act of 1801 had delegated circuit court jurisdiction to circuit judges a year earlier.). 
105. Id. at 304. Congress was not the first to pass legislation that required judicial officials to ride circuit. 
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Anti-Federalist parties in the early Congress as clear causes of that refusal.106 Discussing 
Article Three, Patterson explained that [t]his provision of the constitution was intended 
to place the judges not only beyond the reach of executive power . . . but also to shield 
them from the attack of that party spirit which always predominates in popular 
assemblies. 107 The Court held that the practice of circuit riding was constitutional, but 
the preceding portion of the opinion appears to illustrate the judiciary and legislature s
strained relationship when attempting to adapt the federal courts.108
Congress ignored the practical disadvantages and embraced the political value of 
circuit riding, as the legislative body perceived a need for national politicians to remain in 
touch with citizens at the local level.109 In the young Republic, citizens were dependent 
upon court sessions to receive the news of the day, or to learn about and discuss the doings 
of the politicians. 110 As Congress valued the political benefits of circuit riding justices, 
it mandated the continuance of the practice, and the concerns of those in the judiciary were 
simply not enough to convince Congress to act on the issue.111 The same trend holds true 
today, as the crisis of volume, despite significant warnings issued by federal judges, has 
yet to be addressed.112
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE AND POLITICIZED FEDERALISM HAVE PREVENTED
EFFICIENT ADAPTATION SINCE THE JUDICIARY S FOUNDING.
A. The Constitution Does Not Provide a Method for Adapting the Federal Courts Over 
Time. 
The foregoing discussion raises the question: Where did the early Congress obtain 
its authority to dictate the internal procedures of the judiciary? The text of the Constitution 
does not provide an answer113; rather, its language established the Court, announced its 
jurisdiction (both actual and potential), and limited the legislature s authority over that 
jurisdiction.114 An examination of the Constitution s language does not warrant the 
conclusion, or even justify an inference, that Congress has power over the internal 
Circuit riding was first implemented in thirteenth-century England, when, under duress from the freemen, King 
John signed the Magna Carta. One provision of the famous charter declared that the chief justiciary, shall send 
two justiciaries through every county four times a year, who, with the four knights chosen out of every shire by 
the people, shall hold the said assizes in the county, on the day and at the place appointed. English Translation 
of Magna Carta, BRITISH LIBR. (July 28, 2014), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-
translation. 
 106. 5 U.S. at 304. 
107. Id.
108. Id. at 309 (elaborating that [a]nother reason for reversal is, that the judges of the supreme court have no 
right to sit as circuit judges, not being appointed as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct 
commissions for that purpose. To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice 
and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, 
affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the constructions.  This disposition follows pages of analysis 
where the Court seemed to outline the unconstitutionality of circuit riding.). 
 109. Henry C. Clark, Circuit Riding a Former National Asset, 8 A.B.A. J. 772, 774 (1922). 
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Markey, supra note 23, at 377. 
113. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
114. Id.
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procedures of the Court.115
When the National Constitutional Convention toiled over the principles that would 
outline a new experimental government, it easily reached the conclusion that a federal 
judiciary was imperative.116 An independent federal judiciary was necessary in the 
democratic system, and it was clear that the supreme interpreter of laws needed separation 
from both the creator and the enforcer of laws.117 However, the Convention did find cause 
for debate regarding the organization of the federal judiciary.118 The Federalists desired 
far-reaching national authority in the federal courts, while the Anti-Federalists wished for 
localized federal courts and judges with ties to the local community.119
The following excerpt of Article Three describes the full scope of authority that 
Congress was given over the judiciary: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges . . . 
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office
. . . . 
. . . In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as 
the Congress shall make.
. . . . 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury; and such Trial 
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not 
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may 
by Law have directed.120
This text delegates only a handful of authorities to Congress, in their respective 
order: Congress may ordain and establish inferior courts,121 suspend justices when they 
fail to maintain good behavior,122 determine the compensation of justices,123 and regulate 
any extension of the Court s appellate jurisdiction under exceptions Congress chooses to 
establish.124
The language stating that Congress may from time to time ordain and establish
inferior courts seems to warrant the inference that the authors of the Constitution predicted 
the inevitable need to expand and adapt the court system over time.125 However, no 
portion of Article Three expressly grants Congress authority over the procedures for 
115. Id.
 116. MULLER, WILLIAM HENRY, EARLY HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT 13 (1922). 
117. Id.
118. Id.
 119. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789 1815, at 409 (2011). 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 2 (emphasis added to indicate text relevant to Congress  authority). 
 121. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ( from time to time,  an early indicator that the Founding Fathers understood 
there would be an inevitable need to adapt the courts). 
122. Id.
123. Id (but not diminish  that compensation during their time in office). 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing for the limiting of extensions to appellate jurisdiction that Congress 
chooses to give the Court). 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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adapting or expanding the judiciary.126 This authority is distinct from Congress  authority 
over the expansion or limitation of jurisdiction in inferior courts.127
Rather, Congress assumed this authority as falling under its power of the purse, 
because Article Three did not say otherwise.128 Since the courts often need pecuniary 
resources to expand or adapt with their caseloads, Congress is the inevitable gatekeeper 
for such efforts.129 However, due to politicized federalism, the gates rarely open.130
Congress, composed of a body of elected officials in a state of perpetual feud between 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, failed to provide assistance to the courts for fear of 
advancing the opposition s political stance.131 While this tendency was not protected 
against in the text of the Constitution, it cannot necessarily be concluded that it was 
condoned by its authors.132
B. Judicial Acts Illustrate the Ineffective Relationship Between the Judiciary and 
Congress. 
Notwithstanding the absence of direction in Article Three, there were nonetheless 
periods when expansion and adaptation of the courts were required to keep up with the 
caseloads they faced at a given time in the nation s history. The relevant legislative 
measures often were rushed, lacked foresight, or catered more to political goals than the 
judiciary s requested needs.133 All of the judicial acts were affected in some manner or 
other by politicized federalism, but some were enacted in such a way as to render them 
more harmful than helpful to the judiciary.134 Congress has consistently failed to expand 
or adapt the federal courts as needed throughout the nation s history, as illustrated by the 
following relevant legislation.135
i. The Judiciary Act of 1789 Established a Flawed Federal Court System. 
After the states ratified the Constitution, the primary goal of the newly established 
Congress upon entering office was drafting a judicial bill; a committee led by Oliver 
Ellsworth was entrusted with this responsibility.136 Since Article Three of the Constitution 
only vaguely outlined the judicial framework, Ellsworth s committee had no direction for 
126. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III. 
127. Id.
128. Id.
 129. G. Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse, and Inherent 
Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12, 13 (2005). 
130. Infra Part II.C. 
131. Id.
 132. Surrency, The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 53, 64 (1958). 
133. Infra Part III.B. 
134. Id.
135. Id.
 136. WOOD, supra note 119, at 408 09. Ellsworth played a key role in shaping the first draft of the 
Constitution. Specifically, he helped draft the Connecticut Compromise, creating a bicameral legislature with the 
states being equally represented in the Senate. Seven years after his work establishing the federal court system, 
in 1796, Ellsworth became the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Senator Ellsworth’s Judiciary 
Act, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Senator_Ellsworths_Judiciary_Act.htm 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
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drafting the specific structure of the judiciary.137 In a void of constitutional guidance, the 
committee could shape the judicial framework however it saw fit.138 However, the 
committee had to consider both Federalist desires and Anti-Federalist concerns to ensure 
its bill would be enacted.139
At one end of the spectrum, Federalists desired a far-reaching federal judicial 
power.140 They advocated for implementation of several district courts and judges, all 
capable of enforcing federal law.141 Federalists envisioned the judiciary as a means of 
transmitting their ideals throughout the nation and a necessary instrumentality for pushing 
back against innate state loyalties.142 At the other end of the spectrum, Anti-Federalists 
sought a limited judicial authority, believing the states fully capable of enforcing federal 
law within their borders.143 Because federal judges were appointed, rather than popularly 
elected, Anti-Federalists deemed them inherently un-democratic.144
So, in drafting the Judiciary Act of 1789 ( 1789 Act ), Ellsworth s committee 
searched for middle ground between two starkly contrasting political positions.145 This 
meant that the 1789 Act contained several protections against Anti-Federalists 
concerns.146 Furthermore, the Bill of Rights was enacted around the same time and 
protected individual rights from government encroachment.147 These assurances of 
individual liberty allowed the 1789 Act to receive enough political support from both 
parties for ratification.148
The 1789 Act established a tiered system of federal courts, which consisted of the 
Supreme Court, circuit courts, and district courts.149 Circuit and district courts served as 
the inferior courts  alluded to in Article Three; however, the Act only prescribed judges 
to the district courts.150 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist once remarked, [f]ew
lawyers and law students are aware that the Judiciary Act of 1789 created circuit courts 
but no circuit judges. 151 Ellsworth s committee responded to an immense weight of 
political pressure specifically Anti-Federalists against an excess of federal judges
more than it tailored a judiciary around sound policies of efficiency; the foresight to 
include long-term bulwarks against erosion of judicial hallmarks, while it may have been 
present in some members, could not outweigh the party spirit of the legislative body as a 
whole.152 The system s potential impracticality was overlooked, as both political parties 




 141. WOOD, supra note 119, at 409. 
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 408. 
145. Id. at 409. 
 146. WOOD, supra note 119, at 409. 
147. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amends. I X. 
 148. WOOD, supra note 119, at 409. 
149. Id.; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74 75. 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 151. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754 (quoting 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1790 1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT: 1790 1794, at xxv (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988)). 
 152. Eduardo C. Robreno, Learning to Do Justice: An Essay on the Development of the Lower Federal Courts 
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understood that a federal judiciary needed to be established immediately.153 But this 
hurried ratification raises the questions: What compromises were made, and were there 
negative consequences? 
The 1789 Act required the Circuits to hold jury trials as courts of law and equity.154
As noted earlier, trials in these courts were conducted by a panel of three judges.155 Two 
circuit riding Supreme Court justices would travel to the site of circuit court trials, and a 
district judge completed the panel.156 Structuring the circuit courts in this compromised 
fashion meant that justices of the highest Court were mandated to endure the same kind of 
perilous travel as Lincoln, discussed earlier.157
Supreme Court justices endured the circuit riding practice for over a century, despite 
the physical strain of traveling long distances and the exorbitant amount of time the 
practice consumed.158 In assessing the structure of the federal courts set forth in the 1789 
Act, one author concluded that [t]he Judiciary Act of 1789 was never satisfactory to 
anyone, least of all the litigant who had to depend upon the success of the justice of the 
Supreme Court in braving the elements of his travels . . . 159 It is clear that the physical 
impracticality of requiring such strenuous travel took its toll on the judiciary.160 Because 
Congress did not address the impracticalities of circuit riding, [t]he administration of 
justice on this basis was limited by the tedium of poor transportation, and the vagaries of 
inclement weather. 161
A host of judges voiced concerns of the 1789 Act s potential unconstitutionality.162
Many believed that the judicial framework was incompatible with the Constitution, 
primarily because of instances where a judge might hear a case for a second time after 
appeal from an earlier decision.163 This could occur if a district judge s opinion was 
appealed, as that same district judge could be a member of the three-judge panel at a circuit 
court trial.164 Moreover, Supreme Court justices could hear a case while sitting in panel at 
the circuit level, and later they might rehear the same case if it came before the Supreme 
Court.165
The 1789 Act was indicative of the rampant politicized federalism of the time, and 
the resulting judicial system was inherently flawed as a result.166 Whether based on 
grounds of practicality or unconstitutionality, the 1789 Act established a federal court 
in the Early Years of the Republic, 29 RUTGERS L. J. 555, 561 (1998). 
153. Id.
 154. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 79. 
 155. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74 75. 
156. Id.
157. See Glick, supra note 29, at 1754. 
158. Id.
 159. Surrency, supra note 132, at 58. 
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 58 59. 
163. Id.
 164. Surrency, supra note 132, at 58. 
165. Id.
166. Id. at 58 59 (discussing a variety of concerns regarding the Judiciary Act of 1789 raised by judges at 
different levels of the judiciary). 
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structure that many found irrational.167 In hindsight, the only logical explanation for the 
inherently flawed system is that politicized federalism manifested itself between Congress 
and the judiciary, and the courts suffered as a result. 
Only ten days prior to the Act becoming law on September 24, 1789, James Madison 
lamented the inadequacies of the bill with Edmund Pendleton, a fellow Federalist, member 
of the Continental Congress, and signer of the Constitution: 
The judiciary is now under consideration. I view it as you do, as defective both in its general 
structure, and many of its particular regulations. The attachment of the Eastern members, the 
difficulty of substituting another plan, with the consent of those who agree in disliking the 
bill, the defect of time &c. will however prevent any radical alterations. The most I hope is 
that some offensive violations of Southern jurisprudence may be corrected, and that the 
system may speedily undergo a reconsideration under the auspices of the Judges who alone 
will be able perhaps to set it to rights.168
In other words, the author of the United States Constitution recognized the flaws of 
the judiciary before the 1789 Act was enacted.169 Possessing a keen eye for long-term 
consequences, Madison identified flaws in the structure of the proposed system and also 
in its specific procedural provisions.170 His concerns stemmed from what he perceived to 
be inevitabilities, such as the need for new courts and the predictable failure of Congress 
to provide those courts due to politicized federalism.171 James Madison, more than 
familiar with the underpinning philosophies of the new experimental government, 
considered the judges of the new system responsible for set[ting] it to rights. 172
James Madison, the father of the Constitution, knew that Congress would be 
unhelpful to the judiciary and even predicted the reason referred to by a new name in 
this Comment politicized federalism.173 In describing the entrenched nature of warring 
political factions in the legislature, Madison went on to explain, [t]he difficulty of uniting 
the minds of men accustomed to think and act differently can only be conceived by those 
who have witnessed it. 174
ii. The Judiciary Acts of 1801 and 1802 Demonstrate How Politicized Federalism 
Harms the Federal Courts. 
The imperfections of the judiciary established under the 1789 Act were apparent, 
and Congress often revisited the organization of the courts.175 Between the passage of the 
167. Id.
 168. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789) (on file with the National Archives 
and accessible at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0258) (written ten days before the 





173. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 168. 
174. Id.
 175. Surrency, supra note 132, at 59. In discussing the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court justices wrote 
a letter to President Washington, stating: 
[t]hat when the present Judicial arrangements took place, it appeared to be a general and well founded 
opinion, that the Act then passed was to be considered rather as introducing a temporary expedient, 
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1789 Act and the Judiciary Act of 1801 ( 1801 Act ), Congress passed a total of thirty-
seven acts that affected the organization, place, or time of court sessions in some 
manner.176 However, any significant changes to the organization of the judiciary would 
implicate partisan considerations, as was the case when the 1801 Act was proposed.177
The 1801 Act was steeped in political controversy, flowing directly from the 
perpetual feud between Federalists and Anti-Federalists.178 John Adams, a Federalist, 
occupied the presidency when the legislation was enacted, and the Act s creation of new 
circuit courts allowed him to fill several positions with Federalist judges.179 Trials in the 
circuit courts had been conducted by three-judge panels, consisting of two Supreme Court 
justices and a local district judge.180 Now, the 1801 Act created a new system composed 
of six circuit courts.181 Each of these new circuit courts would employ a panel of three 
judges, positions that had previously been filled by circuit riding Supreme Court justices 
and a local district judge.182 In adding six circuits to the federal court system, the 1801 
Act created sixteen circuit judgeships, and President Adams rushed to fill the vacancies in 
those newly created circuit courts with Federalist judges.183
Anti-Federalists, who rallied behind Thomas Jefferson, heavily criticized the 1801 
Act, as it was wholly incompatible with their ideology.184 Jefferson believed the new 
federal court structure as laid out under the 1801 Act would be utilized to implement 
Federalist principles.185 Infuriated by the actions of President Adams and an opposition-
controlled Congress, Jefferson had no doubt that the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801 was 
than a permanent System, and that it would be revised as soon as a period of greater leisure should 
arrive. 
The justices further explained: 
[t]hat the task of holding twenty seven circuit Courts a year, in the different States, from New 
Hampshire to Georgia, besides two Sessions of the Supreme Court at Philadelphia, in the two most 
severe seasons of the year, is a task which considering the extent of the United States, and the small 
number of Judges, is too burthensome. 
Letter from Supreme Court Justices to President George Washington (Aug. 9, 1792) (on file with the National 
Archives and accessible at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-10-02-0425). 
 176. Surrency, supra note 132, at 64. 
177. Id.
178. Id. at 53. 
179. Id. at 53 54. 
180. Id. at 56. 
181. Compare Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74 75 (stating [t]hat the before mentioned 
districts . . . shall be divided into three circuits . . . and that there shall be held annually in each district of said 
circuits, two courts, which shall be called Circuit Courts, and shall consist of any two justices of the Supreme 
Court, and the district judge of such districts, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum . . . ), with Judiciary 
Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 6, 2 Stat. 89, 90 (stating [t]hat the said districts shall be classed into six circuits . . . there 
shall be in each of the aforesaid circuits . . . three judges of the United States, to be called circuit judges, one of 
whom shall be commissioned as chief judge; and that there shall be a circuit court of the United States, in and 
for each of the aforesaid circuits, to be composed of the circuit judges . . . ). 
 182. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90. 
 183. Id. Only sixteen circuit judgeships were created under the legislation rather than eighteen because of the 
unique structure of the sixth circuit under the 1801 Act. Five of the six newly created circuits would be composed 
of three-judge panels, while the sixth circuit would be composed of a circuit judge, and the judges of the district 
courts of Kentucky and Tennessee; the duty of all of whom it shall be to attend, but any two of whom shall form 
a quorum . . . Id.
 184. Surrency, supra note 132, at 53. 
185. Id.
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a parasitical plant engrafted at the last session on the judiciary body,  a plant that had to 
be lopped off. 186
Senator Breckenridge, on January 4, 1802, brought the repeal of the 1801 Act to the 
forefront of congressional debates.187 He compiled caseload data and aimed to prove that 
the newly created judgeships were unnecessary.188 Furthermore, Senator Breckenridge 
argued that Congress  ability to create new courts also implied its authority to abolish those 
same courts.189 He concluded that Congress had the right to rectify the mistakes of its 
predecessors.190
Federalists, on the other hand, contended that it would be blatantly unconstitutional 
to repeal the 1801 Act.191 This argument hinged on the constitutional provision that gave 
federal judges life tenure during good behavior.192 Because the circuit judge positions had 
already been created, and judges already appointed, Federalists considered the removal of 
the positions a clear violation of the life tenure provision of the Constitution.193
Congress fervently debated the repeal of the 1801 Act until a majority, consisting of 
Anti-Federalists, succeeded in returning the federal judiciary to its prior structure under 
the 1789 Act.194 The Anti-Federalists, in the Judiciary Act of 1802 ( 1802 Act ),
eliminated the circuit courts the year after their creation and, for the only time in history, 
revoked the tenure of federal judges.195 The Anti-Federalists claimed they were not 
legislatively removing the judges  but rather abolishing the courts. 196 Justice Samuel 
Chase, unimpressed by this reasoning, stated that [t]he distinction of taking the Office 
from the Judge, and not the Judge from the Office  was puerile and nonsensical. 197
 186. WOOD, supra note 119, at 420. 
 187. Lowell H. Harrison, John Breckenridge: Western Statesmen, 18 J. SOUTHERN HIST Y 137, 142 (1952). 
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Senator Breckenridge clarified that he: 
could not agree that a judge could hold an office once it ceased to exist, and he found nothing 
unconstitutional in his proposals. If some judges were unable to perform circuit duty, they should be 
allowed to return to that state of tranquility and retirement, from which they must have been no doubt 
reluctantly drawn.
Id. at 142 43. 
191. Id. at 143. Governor Morris led the Federalists in defense of the existing bill. Once established, they 
contended, a court was inviolate. Morris hoped that the Supreme Court would take a part, if necessary, to save 
the Constitution. Id. Discussion earlier in this Comment, regarding the case of Stuart v. Laird, shows that 
Morris  desire for Supreme Court involvement was satisfied, but the result was not at all what he had hoped. See 
supra notes 103 08 and accompanying text. 
192. See Harrison, supra note 187, at 142 43; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 193. Harrison, supra note 187, at 142 43. 
194. Id. [Breckenridge] denied the power of a court to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress; each 
branch of government had exclusive authority in its own sphere. On Wednesday, February 3, as twilight darkened 
the windows, the bill passed the Senate 16-15, and the House concurred a month later. Id. Breckenridge s denial 
of a court s ability to strike down legislation as unconstitutional is an interesting precursor to the landmark 
decision in Marbury v. Madison, decided one year later in 1803. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 
1803). 
 195. WOOD, supra note 119, at 420 21. 
196. Id. at 421. 
197. Id. Chief Justice John Marshall agreed with Justice Chase s viewpoint. However, Justices Cushing and 
Patterson, as well as President Washington, thought it best to accept the new legislation anyway. Marshall 
accepted this, and he himself returned to circuit riding as the Judiciary Act of 1802 required. In one instance, 
Chief Justice John Marshall forgot to pack a pair of pants, so [h]e had to sit in judgment, covering his legs with 
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The judges who had been appointed to the circuit positions created in the 1801 Act, 
only to have those positions done away with a year later in the 1802 Act, petitioned 
Congress as to the constitutionality of their judgeships being removed.198 Congress then 
referred the judges  petition to a committee.199 The committee recommended that the 
Attorney General file a quo warranto against one of the circuit judges, so that the nature 
of the circuit judgeship could be judicially considered.200 The quo warranto suit was never 
filed, likely because President Jefferson s Attorney General lacked sympathy for the 
Federalist circuit judges  plight.201 Therefore, the constitutionality of repealing the 1801 
Act was never considered, despite the doubts held by justices of the highest Court about 
the constitutionality of the legislature s actions.202
iii. Legislation Aimed Directly at the Circuits Is Not Immune from Politicized 
Federalism. 
Throughout the Nineteenth Century, Congress continued to pass politically 
motivated judicial acts that altered the judiciary in a variety of ways. While Jefferson still 
occupied the presidency in 1807, the Seventh Circuit Act ( 1807 Act ) was ratified and a 
new seat on the Supreme Court created.203 The total number of justices went from six to 
seven, and the additional justice would ride circuit in the newly created Seventh Circuit.204
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio were all included within the Seventh Circuit boundary, 
and these states proved challenging for justices traveling westward in an expanding 
nation.205 The Seventh Circuit Act required the Supreme Court justice presiding over the 
Seventh Circuit to reside within the boundaries of that jurisdiction.206 This is the only 
instance in the judiciary s history of a residency requirement having been imposed on a 
Supreme Court justice, a requirement that appealed to Anti-Federalists who sought a close 
connection between federal politicians and local communities.207
The Tenth Circuit Act of 1863 ( 1863 Act ) raised the number of circuit courts to 
ten and the total number of Supreme Court justices to ten as well.208 The Tenth Circuit 
established in 1863 was not the same Tenth Circuit that exists today.209 The 1863 Act 
his robe.  RICHARD BROOKHISER, JOHN MARSHALL: THE MAN WHO MADE THE SUPREME COURT 85 (2018). 





203. See Landmark Legislation: Seventh Circuit, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-judicial-legislation-text-document-3 (last visited Nov. 4, 
2019); see generally Seventh Circuit Act, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 420 (1807). 
204. Landmark Legislation: Seventh Circuit, FED. JUD. CTR., 





 208. Tenth Circuit Act, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794 (1863); Stanley & Russell, The Political and Administrative 
History of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 60 DENV. L.J. 119, 119 (1982). 
 209. Stanley & Russell, supra note 208, at 122. 
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included California and Oregon, states currently included in the Ninth Circuit.210 Congress 
abolished the Tenth Circuit three years after its creation and redistributed the states in its 
jurisdiction among the other nine circuits.211 Subsequently, any other states that joined the 
Union were also assigned to one of the existing nine circuits.212
The abolition of the Tenth Circuit was achieved through the Judicial Circuits Act of 
1866 ( 1866 Act ), only a year after the conclusion of the American Civil War.213 The 
legislation provided for a total of nine circuit courts, and it expressly listed the states to be 
included within each circuit s jurisdiction.214 In a major departure from the 1863 Act 
passed three years prior, California and Oregon were included under the Ninth Circuit s
purview, where they remain today.215 In its passage of the 1866 Act, a majority Republican 
Congress, primarily concerned with post-war reconstruction efforts, refused to give 
President Johnson, an opponent of the reconstruction effort, the opportunity to appoint a 
Supreme Court justice.216 Thus, Congress designed the 1866 Act to prevent that 
outcome.217 To do this, Congress specified that no new appointments could be made to 
the Supreme Court until the Court s membership had been reduced, by justices  deaths or 
resignations, from nine to seven.218
The jurisdictional boundaries set forth in the 1866 Act have remained largely the 
same for over 150 years.219 Congress has subsequently only adjusted the boundaries to 
include new states in existing circuits and to divide two large circuits.220 The 1866 Act 
was part of the Republican Party s broader goal of lessening the disproportionate 
representation of southern states prior to the American Civil War.221 Before the war began, 
five of the nine circuits were composed entirely of slave states.222
iv. Politicized Federalism Continued Influencing the Federal Courts Throughout 
the Nineteenth Century. 
In 1891, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, William Evarts, 
introduced legislation that would address an overwhelming caseload in the federal 
judiciary, similar to the modern crisis of volume.223 At a time when the Supreme Court 
210. Id.
211. Id.; see Judicial Circuits Act, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209 (1866). 
 212. Stanley & Russell, supra note 208, at 122. 
213. Id.; see Judicial Circuits Act, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209 (1866). 
 214. Stanley & Russell, supra note 208, at 122. 
215. Id.
 216. David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 432 (2008). 
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Landmark Legislation: Reorganization of the Judicial Circuits, FED. JUD. CTR., 





 223. James L. Oakes, Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, Address at the Centennial Celebration of the Evarts 
Act and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (June 13, 1991), in 46 REC. ASS N B. CITY 
N.Y. 480, 482 (1991). Evarts had been President Lincoln s second choice to succeed Chief Justice Taney in 1864, 
but instead, he would become the United States Attorney General. Id.
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had 1600 cases awaiting its attention, Evarts understood that the highest Court needed 
relief.224 Evarts sympathized with the overburdened judiciary, and he led the legislative 
effort to provide a remedy for its ailment.225
The Judiciary Act of 1891 ( 1891 Act ) created the United States Circuit Courts of 
Appeals.226 The new circuit courts were given appellate jurisdiction over cases heard by 
the federal district courts, and new circuit judgeships were created, thus eliminating the 
need for justices of the Court to continue their circuit riding duties.227 Evarts  legislation 
established the Circuits as they are today and was one of the farthest-reaching judicial 
reforms in American history, as it re-delegated around three-quarters of the Supreme 
Court s jurisdiction to the newly created United States Courts of Appeals.228 In total, over 
100 years passed between the time the federal courts were instituted and the abolition of 
circuit riding came to fruition.229
Later, the Judicial Code of 1911 ( 1911 Act ) was enacted and primarily intended 
to re-codify the laws pertaining to the judiciary, which are now found in Title 28 of the 
United States Code.230 Outside of that primary function, the 1911 Act also unburdened 
the Circuits of their trial jurisdiction.231 Since the Circuits no longer possessed trial 
jurisdiction, the perception of potential unconstitutionality faded from the federal courts, 
at least insofar as the same judge could no longer hear a case at both the trial and appellate 
levels.232
In a subsequent effort to lessen the caseload of the Supreme Court, the Judiciary Act 
of 1925 ( 1925 Act ) gave the Court the option of deciding not to decide  by designating 
the writ of certiorari as a means by which the Court could either grant or deny review of 
cases.233 After the 1925 Act was enacted, the vast majority of cases appealed to the 
Supreme Court were denied certiorari, greatly reducing the Court s caseload.234 The 
legislation meant that the Circuits  decisions carried even more importance, as they were 
much less likely to be overturned by the Supreme Court.235
The 1925 Act, while reducing the Supreme Court s caseload, drastically increased 
the caseload of the Circuits.236 As a result, the Circuits had significantly more influence 
in the shaping of stare decisis.237 The Circuits have since become the courts of last resort 
in 99% of cases brought before them due to increasingly restrictive rules of certiorari in 
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
 227. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826. 
 228. R. Bunn, Proposed Changes in the Federal Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, 1 N. W. L. REV. 139, 139
(1893). 
229. Id.
230. See generally 28 U.S.C. 
231. See Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087. 
232. See id. (for the statutory language that removed trial jurisdiction from the Circuits). 
 233. Jonathan Sternberg, Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925 and the Discretionary Court, 33 
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1, 1 (2008). 
234. Id.
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the Supreme Court,238 and the effects of the crisis of volume have manifested more 
broadly in the nation s jurisprudence with an infinitesimal chance of further review by the 
highest Court.239
v. The Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 Is the Most Recent Example of Legislation 
That Was Inadequate Because of Politicized Federalism. 
The Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 ( 1990 Act ) was Title Two of the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990.240 The legislation, now thirty years old, is the most recent example 
of Congress adding judgeships to the federal courts.241 The 1990 Act provided for an 
addition of eleven circuit judgeships, sixty-one district judgeships, and thirteen temporary 
district judgeships.242 In the years prior to the Act s ratification in 1990, the Circuits
workload grew by approximately 30% from 1984.243
The 1990 Act was a step in the right direction, but it provided far fewer judgeships 
than were sought by the judiciary.244 In 1990, Chief Justice Rehnquist thanked the 
congressional leaders who made the additional judgeships possible, but he also made it 
clear that there was a need for more, stating [w]ith our overall caseload continuing to 
multiply, the judiciary will be facing a continued need for expansion of our budget. 245
The 1990 Act, with respect to the Circuits, provided about half of the judgeships that the 
Federal Courts Study Committee had recommended.246 Of the twenty judgeships that the 
committee had recommended, eleven were granted under the enacted legislation.247
The need for ongoing adaptation of the federal courts was at least acknowledged by 
the 1990 Act, as the legislation included a provision that would require further study of 
the issue.248 This further study came to fruition when the Federal Judicial Center presented 
 238. Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken Is It?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 691, 
691 (2004) (citing John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Appointments Process 
Under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 27 (2003)). 
239. Id.





 245. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, STATE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (ed. Shelley L. Dowling, 1990). 
 246. FED. JUD. CTR., FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1990 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1990). 
247. Id. Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Joseph Biden, introducing the Judgeship Act of 1990 in 
the Senate, stated: 
We have taken the recommendations [of the Judicial Conference] seriously, as the Judiciary 
Committee has always done. But in the end, the Judicial Conference s recommendations are just that
recommendations. Nothing more, nothing less . . . I know of no other part of the Federal Government 
where regional agencies call national headquarters, ask for a multi-million dollar commitment of 
resources, and then are given by the Congress exactly what they want, no questions asked . . . [In the 
Judgeship Act of 1990, changes were made in the Judicial Conference s recommendations 
principally] to ensure that high-intensity drug areas get the resources they need to hear the cases, 
preside over the trials and sentence those who are convicted. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE ON S. 2648,
at 28 (1990) (illustrating the way in which temporary political motivations affect the support that the judiciary 
receives from Congress). 
 248. Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650. In Chief Justice Rehnquist s 1990 Report of the 
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a report titled Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals  to 
Congress in 1993.249 The report discussed several threats to the judicial process that 
scholars and judges had identified, and it also suggested structural alternatives to remedy 
those threats.250 Despite the enormous amount of resources that were dedicated to the 
production of that report, no significant alterations to the judicial structure, or addition of 
judgeship positions, were implemented following its release.251
C. Constitutional Silence and Politicized Federalism Have Always Been the True 
Culprits. 
Politicized federalism has affected the judiciary in largely the same way throughout 
all of American history.252 Whether it be the struggles of the early Court in abolishing 
circuit riding or the contemporary crisis of volume, the same roadblock impedes the federal 
judiciary when it seeks adaptation of the courts to keep up with an evolving caseload.253
This roadblock results from the inherent characteristics of the legislature and the judiciary, 
as well as the powers possessed by each.254 As the Constitution instructs, Congress 
legislates in response to an ever-present need for new policy, while the Circuits and 
Supreme Court naturally look at those same laws in retrospect.255 With one branch passing 
laws in anticipation of policy needs and the other branch reviewing those laws after the 
fact, some degree of tension will inevitably result, but this tension was expected and 
desired by the Constitutional Convention.256 Beyond that desired degree of tension, 
politicized federalism increased the strain exponentially.257
In the founding of the nation, the concept of federalism was viewed as a compromise 
rather than a perfect solution for either the Federalist or Anti-Federalist party 
individually.258 The government established under the Articles of Confederation had left 
each state to act as its own sovereign entity and not a cohesive union, which led to a variety 
of problems.259 However, the Founding Fathers had not forgotten the consequences of an 
all-powerful centralized government either; the Declaration of Independence serves as an 
immortal reminder of that sentiment, as its language repeatedly rebuked the tyranny that 
resulted from a single entity, the King of England, possessing exclusive authority to 
State of the Judiciary, he thanked Senator Joseph Biden and Representative Jack Brooks, the respective chairmen 
of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees at that time, for their leading roles in enacting the Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1990. REHNQUIST, supra note 245, at 9. 
249. See generally FED. JUD. CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS (1993). 
250. See generally id.
251. Id.
252. Supra Part II.B. 
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, III. 
256. Id.
257. Id.
 258. Loren P. Beth, The Supreme Court and American Federalism, 10 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 376, 378 (1965). 
259. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 21 (John Jay) (Am. Bar 
Ass n ed. 2009) ( To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected 
sovereignties situated in the same neighborhood would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and 
to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages. ). 
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govern.260 Another compromised aspect of an experimental government, federalism was 
a calculated hypothesis of how best to delegate authority, and the branches of government 
were its variables.261 It was apparent early on that the judiciary would not be isolated from 
the uncertainty of the experiment.262
Federalism contributed in a tangible way to the strained relationship between the 
early courts and Congress.263 The Court, as the supreme interpreter of laws, proposed the 
elimination of circuit riding and the creation of intermediate appellate courts, as the court 
system established under the 1789 Act had been impractical and the administration of 
justice strained.264 Congress ignored those pleas for over a century because it was 
politically advantageous to keep the status quo or politically unworkable to do 
otherwise.265
The perpetual feud between Federalists and Anti-Federalists rages on today.266 The 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists identify themselves under different names but hold largely 
the same ideals.267 The Democratic Party advocates for similar policy considerations as 
Federalists did centuries earlier, such as an emphasis on centralized government to regulate 
when state governments are inadequate to handle national issues.268 Similarly but 
conversely, the Republican Party holds many of the same foundational views as the Anti-
Federalists, such as minimizing the federal government s reach and states having a broader 
authoritative role.269 Whatever names the political parties attribute to their platforms, the 
effects of their partisan differences on the judiciary remain largely the same. Two centuries 
ago, justices of the Supreme Court endured cross-country travel because they were 
mandated to do so, despite the swarm of concerns surrounding the circuit riding 
practice.270 Today, the Circuits endure an overwhelming caseload because Congress has 
not addressed the crisis of volume, despite judicial requests for legislative relief.271
260. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) ( The history of the present King of Great Britain 
is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute 
Tyranny over these States. )
261. See generally Beth, supra note 258. 
262. Id.
263. See supra Part III.B.ii. 
264. See generally Glick, supra note 31. 
265. See supra Part III.B.i ii. 
266. See generally Republican Platform, GOP, https://www.gop.com/platform/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2019) 
( Government should be smaller, smarter and more efficient ); Party Platform, DNC, 
https://democrats.org/where-we-stand/party-platform/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2019). 
267. See sources cited supra note 266. 
268. See generally DNC, supra note 266. 
269. See generally GOP, supra note 266. 
270. Supra Part II.B. 
271. Infra Part IV. Politicized federalism can appear in the relationship between a State and Congress as well. 
In October of 2015, Arizona s Governor wrote a letter to Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, and Senate Majority 
Leader, Mitch McConnell, requesting that legislation be considered to remove Arizona from the Ninth Circuit s
jurisdiction. Letter from Governor Douglas A. Ducey to Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell (Oct. 30, 2015) (accessible at https://azgovernor.gov/governor/governor-duceys-letter-
house-speaker-ryan-senate-majority-leader-mcconnell). The State of Arizona has been frustrated in recent years 
with, inter alia, the Ninth Circuit s caseload (14, 076 pending cases, nearly three times greater than the next 
largest circuit), Supreme Court reversal rate (77%), and average disposition time (fifteen months). Id. In his letter, 
Governor Ducey cited calls for reform of the Ninth Circuit by Supreme Court Justices Byron White and Sandra 
Day O Connor. Id. Justice White had stated that [t]he volume of opinions produced by the Ninth Circuit s Court 
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Comparing the early practice of circuit riding with the modern crisis of volume, it is 
clear that both threatened and the latter continues to threaten the effectiveness of the 
judiciary in administering justice.272 The federal courts reached out to Congress in 
response to both judicial ailments and sought remedies that would allow them to 
administer justice more effectively.273 However, then and now, Congress has proven 
inadequate to help the courts in a timely manner.274
IV. THE CRISIS OF VOLUME IS THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF AN OLD INFECTION.
The crisis of volume  is a multifaceted issue with an array of potential solutions;275
however, the most effective solutions to a problem can only be identified when informed 
by analysis of the root cause. The root cause of the crisis of volume can be gleaned from 
the way the infection has repeatedly manifested itself throughout the history of the 
judiciary.276 The practice of circuit riding that strained the early Circuit jurisdictions, and 
the modern crisis of volume currently weighing down the Circuits, are one in the same.277
When the same infection plagues the same victim and causes the same symptoms since 
the time the victim was born, the only logical conclusion is that the infection must stem 
from a fundamental flaw in the victim s DNA; in this instance, that fundamental flaw is 
the absence of a provision for judicial adaptation in Article Three of the Constitution.278
In the absence of that provision, attempts to adapt the courts by legislative means have 
been rendered ineffective due to politicized federalism.279
A. The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee Addressed the Problem Thirty 
Years Ago. 
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee ( Study Committee ) issued the 
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee ( 1990 Report ) and declared that the 
Circuits  caseload had reached a state of crisis, threatening the hallmarks of our 
judiciary. 280 The Study Committee described those hallmarks to include that: 
judges do most of their own work, grant oral argument in cases that need it, decide cases 
with sufficient thought, and produce opinions in cases of precedential importance with the 
care they deserve, including independent, constructive insight and criticism from judges on 
the court and the panel other than the judge writing the opinion.281
of Appeals and the judges  overall workload combine to make it impossible for all the court s judges to read all 
the court s published opinions when they are issued. Id. However, despite several calls for restructuring the 
Ninth Circuit, such a reform has proven politically unpalatable in Congress thus far. 
272. See generally Glick, supra note 29; Markey, supra note 23. 
273. Supra Part III.C. 
274. Id.
 275. George D. Brown, Nonideological Judicial Reform and Its Limits – The Report of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV 973, 973 (1990). 
276. Supra Part III.B C. 
277. Supra Part III.C. 
278. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
279. Supra Part III.C. 
 280. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109. 
281. Id.
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With first-hand experience handling the burgeoning caseload, Judge Miner, of the 
Second Circuit, gave remarks in 2013, in which he stated that Congress ha[d] failed to 
act effectively in responding to the major structural or procedural options  identified in 
the [1990] Report. 282 Judge Miner is not the only judge to proclaim in recent years that 
the crisis of volume  is alive and well today, but, thirty years later, the solutions offered 
in the 1990 Report have yet to be attempted.283 In light of these judges  first-hand 
knowledge regarding the crisis, paired with the truth that crises are meant to be addressed, 
the issue must again be examined. 
The judiciary should be able to adapt efficiently in response to an ever-evolving 
caseload, but Article Three offers no efficient apparatus for such a purpose.284 The federal 
courts have had little alternative but to request Congress  assistance, but the history 
surrounding those requests suggests that the congressional avenue is inadequate.285 One 
commentator points out that the only dialogue is between the Court and law review 
writers. Perhaps Congress will step in, but this is likely to happen in the context of a 
specific issue . . . rather than as part of an overall look at the federal courts. 286
Unfortunately, such a multifaceted problem cannot be addressed by the occasional 
correction of one facet individually.287 Further complicating the issue, truly meaningful 
reform would implicate partisan considerations.288 Thus, politicized federalism enters the 
conversation.289
An ideological approach to federal judicial reform emphasizes basic systemic value 
issues such as balancing the need to vindicate national authority against claims of some 
form of state sovereignty . . . 290 In the early years of the American Republic, federalism 
penetrated all aspects of political discussion, and the judiciary was not immune from the 
effects of partisan interests.291 One prime example discussed earlier in this Comment, 
Thomas Jefferson and John Adams passionately fought against each other to see their 
visions of the federal judiciary realized in the judicial acts of 1801 and 1802.292
The politicization of judicial issues is inherent within the design of the American 
government, and politicized federalism manifesting itself within the context of judicial 
 282. Miner, supra note 4, at 552 53. 
283. Id.
284. Supra Part III.A. 
285. See supra Part III.B.; see also JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., STATE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ANNUAL
REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 3 (2013) 
I would like to choose a fresher topic, but duty calls. The budget remains the single most important 
issue facing the courts . . . We in the Judiciary recognize what should be clear to all: The Nation needs 
a balanced financial ledger to remain strong at home and abroad. We do not consider ourselves 
immune from the fiscal constraints that affect every department of government. But, as I have pointed 
out previously, the independent Judicial Branch consumes only the tiniest sliver of federal revenues, 
just two-tenths of one percent of the federal government s total outlays. 
Id.
 286. Brown, supra note 275, at 994. 
287. Id.
288. Id. at 974. 
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Supra Part II.B. 
292. Supra Part III.B.ii. 
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adaptation is not, in and of itself, a problem. However, when politicized federalism 
manifested itself within the void of uncertainty created by constitutional silence, a serious 
illness began to spread. This illness, commonly referred to as the crisis of volume,
damages the judiciary in often intangible ways and gradually harms the system of justice 
that the Founding Fathers envisioned over two centuries ago.293
In its 1990 Report, the Study Committee presented an ultimatum for the judiciary s
future.294 Contemplating how changes in the appellate courts might be brought about, the 
Study Committee queried, will those changes be insidious and unplanned; will oral 
argument and reasoned opinions simply fade away . . . [o]r will Congress and the courts 
fashion new structures and procedures specifically designed to preserve the hallmarks of 
our judiciary? 295 Unfortunately, three decades have passed since the 1990 Report, and 
the Study Committee s questions have been answered; the changes were insidious and 
unplanned. 296
B. What Is the Current State of the “Crisis of Volume?”
The American population has consistently grown since the founding of the nation.297
Generally, this has meant a corresponding increase in cases filed in the federal courts.298
In 1790, immediately following the ratification of the 1789 Act, estimates of the 
population were around 3.9 million.299 In 1800, one year prior to the controversy 
surrounding the acts of 1801 and 1802, the population was estimated at around 5.3 
million.300 Jumping forward to 1890, one year before circuit riding was abolished, the 
population had grown to about 63 million.301 In 1920, five years before Congress gave the 
Supreme Court the power to deny review of cases, the population was estimated at around 
118 million.302 In 1990, the year Congress last added judgeships to the Circuits, the 
population was estimated at 248 million.303 As of 2010, the population was estimated at 
309 million,304 and the current estimate in 2019 is 330 million.305
While it seems like common sense that rises in population would result in increases 
of litigation, not all have accepted that connection as factual.306 Some commentators point 
to the overall decrease of federal filings in recent years as evidence that the crisis has 
faded; however, one group of individuals has more first-hand experience with caseload 
trends than any other the judges that hear the cases and judges have made it clear that the 




 297. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789 1940, at 25 (1949). 
298. See Thomas B. Marvell, Caseload Growth–Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151, 151 (1987). 




 303. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION GENERAL POPULATION STATISTICS 1. 
304. 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-
census/decade.2010.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
305. Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2019). 
 306. Marvell, supra note 298, at 151. 
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crisis of volume is alive and well despite the recent decrease in filings.307 While the overall 
number of appeals has decreased slightly in recent years, the filings have still increased by 
about 20% since the 1990 Report was released.308 A close examination of case 
management statistics reveals alarming trends that indicate the crisis has deepened since 
the 1990 Report.309
Certain statistics relate directly to those hallmarks of our judiciary  as described by 
the Study Committee in its 1990 Report.310 The first of those hallmarks was that judges 
do their own work. 311 Since 1990, there has been a 15.2% increase in procedural 
terminations of cases by staff rather than by judge.312 The Study Committee identified 
another hallmark, that judges grant oral argument in cases that need it. 313 In 2018, cases 
were terminated on the merits without oral argument 24.9% more often than they were in 
1990.314 The Study Committee further stated that judges should give each case the amount 
of time and thought it deserved.315 In 2018, the use of unpublished opinions had increased 
by just under 20% since the 1990 Report.316
In light of these particularized statistics, it is obvious that the infection persists, even 
despite the slight decline of appeals in recent years.317 But what do those statistics mean 
for the day-to-day functions of the Circuits? About half a century ago, the federal appellate 
process looked drastically different.318 In 1988, Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit 
lamented the deterioration of the personally conducted  federal appellate process: 
 As performed as recently as twenty years ago, the personally conducted federal 
appellate process comprised: (1) review of the record and briefs by the judge; (2) oral 
argument of thirty or forty-five minutes on a side; (3) preparation by the judge of a written 
opinion; (4) assistance in each chambers by one elbow law clerk and one secretary; and (5) 
frequent and adequate conferences of the judges on the cases. 
 As performed today, the bureaucratically conducted federal appellate process 
comprises: (1) screening and track-setting by staff attorneys; (2) review of records and briefs 
by a law clerk or a staff attorney; (3) oral argument in less than one third of the cases, and 
then for fifteen or twenty minutes on a side; (4) preparation of opinions by law clerks and 
staff attorneys; (5) dispositions without opinions in two-thirds of the cases; (6) assistance in 
each chambers by three law clerks and two secretaries and assistance to all chambers by a 
corps of staff attorneys; and (7) infrequent, short judicial conferences on the cases. In sum, 
all appellate opinions were once the product of judges; today most are the product of an 
307. See Miner, supra note 4; see also Markey, supra note 23. 
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institution.319
The ever-increasing caseload, in a manner similar to tactics of attrition warfare, 
overpowered the personally conducted  federal appellate process, and, since Congress 
rendered no aid, the Circuits succumbed to unjustifiable means of dispensing justice.320
Judge Markey concluded that [t]he churning, feverish effort to keep up  has saved the 
system s  façade; but lost its soul a judge with fully adequate time to contemplate, think, 
write and re-write. 321
In hearing appeals from the federal district courts, the Circuits play a pivotal role in 
maintaining American jurisprudence by stare decisis.322 State courts are often persuaded 
to follow precedent established in their respective circuit, and federal district courts are 
obligated to do so, but the development and quality of this precedent is hindered when the 
Circuits are overburdened.323 Tragically, the crisis overwhelmed the Circuits to such an 
extent that an evolution of the judicial process was unavoidable.324 Without congressional 
intervention, each Circuit had no choice but to adapt in ways that were reactive rather than 
proactive.325 The harmful effects of this insidious and unplanned  evolution have 
undoubtedly hampered the production of quality stare decisis in the Circuits.326
Each Circuit reacted to its caseload in unique ways.327 For example, the Second 
Circuit and Ninth Circuit each implemented starkly contrasting strategies for keeping up 
with their cases.328 Both the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit dealt with the judicial chaos 
that followed the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing increase of immigration cases.329 The 
Second Circuit ensured that each litigant in those cases was allowed time for oral 
argument, but the Ninth Circuit allowed less than 10% of litigants the chance to present 
oral argument.330 The Second Circuit maintained its reputation for upholding the right to 
oral argument of every litigant, at the cost of reducing its reversal rate.331 The Ninth 
Circuit, with the largest appellate caseload of all, significantly limited its allowance of oral 
arguments, and a reduction in its reversal rate did not occur.332
This was only one instance of a seemingly endless number of circuit-specific 
tradeoffs  that developed as judges coped with the crisis of volume.333 These 
individualized methods of adaptation developed out of necessity rather than careful 
consideration or forward-thinking strategy, and each circuit-specific tradeoff reflects the 
319. Id. at 376 77. 
320. Id. at 377. 
321. Id. at 379. 
 322. Sloan, Amy E., The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the 
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unique circumstances of the particular Circuit that implemented them.334 While each 
Circuit dealt with the crisis in unique ways, the overall effect of the infection remained the 
same.335 Judges became less involved, law clerks and staff attorneys were relied on more 
heavily, and published opinions were issued with substantially less frequency.336
The judge s role in the new era of the federal appellate process looks nothing like it 
did just a few decades ago.337 As Judge Markey explained, the judicial process at the 
appellate level has been replaced by the judicial process . . . the reputations of appellate 
judges and courts turn today on fast processing on getting the cases out not on personal 
scholarship, memorable elucidation, or clear, forward thinking. 338 In response to the 
overwhelming volume of cases, the judiciary implored Congress to help with the crisis, 
just as it had centuries earlier with the practice of circuit riding, but Congress again sat 
idly by while the judiciary suffered.339 As a result, personal, deliberative judicial 
decisionmaking  dissipated, and the modern appellate process became an institutionalized 
conveyor belt of justice.340
C. The Death of the “Personally Conducted” Federal Appellate Process Must Be 
Mourned if It Is Ever to Be Born Again. 
The Founding Fathers would likely scoff at the modern federal appellate process.341
Federalist Paper No. 78 offers some insight into the founders  intentions for the judicial 
process: 
 If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited 
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong 
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much 
as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful 
performance of so arduous a duty.
 This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the 
rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or 
the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people 
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more 
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations 
in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community . . . But it is 
easy to see that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their 
duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been 
instigated by the major voice of the community.342
As Alexander Hamilton stated in the above passage, a judge s role requires 
independence, time for contemplation, and fortitude against the erosion of constitutional 
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values.343 Federal judges were intended as a sword in the sheath of the minority.344
Hamilton spoke of a government in which an often unwieldy bicameral legislature 
succumbed to the momentary desires of its constituents, and, as the path to hell is often 
paved with good intentions, the fortitude of independent judges was meant to protect 
against the irrationality of the temporary.345
This Comment does not seek to degrade the work of federal judges as if they have 
forsaken their guardianship of the Constitution; rather, it is intended to illustrate the way 
judges have been hamstrung in their efforts.346 The judges were once the sole mechanism 
by which the judiciary functioned, and they were allotted ample time to perform their 
tasks.347 In dealing with the crisis of volume, judges had no choice but to delegate work 
to their staffs, and the ample time they once had was reduced to the bare minimum 
necessary to keep up with the cases.348 The nature of justice speaks for itself on the 
seriousness of this issue. It calls to mind an image of the blindfolded woman, balancing 
her scales with the utmost care and contemplation. Justice cannot become synonymous 
with a conveyor belt. 
If the crisis of volume is cured and the personally conducted  appellate process 
successfully restored, that will not be the end of the judiciary s predicament.349 The DNA 
of the patient is still flawed; the Constitution still does not provide the judiciary with an 
efficient apparatus for adaptation.350 As stated earlier, the judiciary needs its own immune 
system to ward off recurring attacks. Whether it be the practice of circuit riding or the 
crisis of volume, history has consistently demonstrated the inability of the judiciary to 
adapt with the needs of the present day.351 But what does a judicial immune system look 
like?
An immune system must be able to identify and neutralize threats against the body 
it protects. The identification of threats has not been the primary issue, as judges, scholars, 
and the legal community all naturally monitor the federal courts for these potential issues; 
however, once those threats are identified, the judiciary has consistently been unable to 
neutralize them.352 Article Three s silence and politicized federalism created a two-
pronged dilemma: (1) at what point has the judiciary crossed a threshold beyond which it 
is no longer healthy, and (2) what is the most efficient method for remedying the ailments 
that initially pushed it beyond that threshold to begin with? 
Both of these prongs are addressable, regardless of political ideology, by simply 
drawing a line in the sand that the hallmarks of the judiciary must never fall below. The 
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sufficient to identify when the judiciary is threatened.353 But the identification of the 
problem is only one half of an immune system s responsibility. For effective response to 
an identified threat, there must be a clear threshold at which lawmakers are required to act, 
irrespective of partisan considerations. 
The hallmarks of our judiciary  erode away when the workload of judges becomes 
too strained, and while the intangible sanctity of the judicial process is hard to measure, 
statistics and first-hand experience of judges are more than sufficient to inform lawmakers 
of the need for action.354 The reports addressing the crisis of volume illustrate this 
reality.355 All that is truly needed to complete the judicial immune system is an 
enumeration of the thresholds that cannot be crossed. For example, if a Circuit reaches x
number of cases per judge, lawmakers must address the issue. These thresholds would be 
simple measures of judicial capacity, and, when that capacity is exceeded, assistance must 
be rendered if the judicial hallmarks  are to avoid erosion.356
The legislature must be persuaded to implement these thresholds if the fundamental 
flaw in the judiciary s DNA is ever to be remedied, and the remedy must be tailored in 
such a way as to avoid the perpetual debate in congress that is politicized federalism. All 
that is required to understand the need for such thresholds is a bipartisan respect for the 
judiciary, and, in theory at least, that should still exist. 
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment was never intended to set forth specific methods for addressing the 
caseload of the United States Courts of Appeals. Other authors, cited throughout, have 
spoken to the specific needs of the judiciary in addressing the crisis.357 However, this 
Comment does aim to inform the implementation of potential solutions by describing the 
root causes of the infection plaguing the courts today. Furthermore, it should illustrate that 
the current appellate process is dysfunctional.358 A crisis ignored does not go away, and 
the American judiciary may remain short-circuited indefinitely without the aid of those 
who cherish it enough to find a cure for its ailment. 
Statistics indicate that the hallmarks of our judiciary  continue to erode further the 
longer the crisis of volume spreads without cure.359 The current generation of law students 
will be oblivious to the personally conducted  appellate process that once existed, as the 
bureaucratically conducted  appellate process has become the norm.360 Unfamiliar with 
a history that is rarely discussed, students are unaware of how prevalent oral arguments 
used to be, how direct the link was between a judge s own work and the opinions they 
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produced, and how published opinions used to be more common than unpublished.361 This 
generation of law students will begin their careers ignorant of the fact that the Circuits
boundaries were last drawn in 1866, when the Ninth Circuit was mostly unsettled 
territory.362 The legacy of those judges that endured the circuit riding practice has mostly 
been forgotten, and the burden of the current judges is largely overlooked.363
The federal court system was flawed from the time of its inception, as Article Three 
provided no efficient method for necessary adaptation or expansion of the judiciary.364
Subsequent legislation has failed to address the judiciary s symptoms, and the weakened 
state of the judicial body has become the norm.365 The failure of Congress to support the 
judiciary stems from the manifestation of politicized federalism in the relationship 
between the two branches.366 The harmful effects of the judiciary s current state are too 
significant to be accepted as the norm, and the hallmarks of the judiciary must be 
fortified.367 Once the judiciary is returned to a healthy state, legislative action must be 
taken to ensure that those judicial hallmarks never fall below stated thresholds of health 
again.368 And for the love of the judiciary, Congress should put partisan differences aside 
when considering legislation aimed at preserving the judicial hallmarks.369
- Adam Heavin*
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